Global attention in the coming days will be focused on the NATO Summit in Ankara, where continued support for Ukraine will be one of the key items on the agenda. At the same time, Allied leaders will concentrate on increasing defense investment, strengthening the defense industrial base, and expanding defence production in line with the current security environment. For this reason, the program will also feature the NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum, dedicated to enhancing the Alliance's defense industrial capacity.

In an interview with Ukrinform, Kadir Temiz, President of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) in Ankara, PhD, and international relations expert, discusses expectations for the NATO Summit, Türkiye's role within the Alliance and its potential as a mediator in efforts to end Russia's war against Ukraine, global transformations in the security landscape, the prospects for U.S.-Iran negotiations, and China's growing influence in shaping the emerging international order.

DISCUSSION OF UKRAINE AT THE NATO SUMMIT WILL GO FAR BEYOND THE WAR ITSELF

- Mr. Temiz, Türkiye is hosting the NATO Summit this week. One of the key items on the agenda is continued support for Ukraine. What are your expectations for the Summit, and what outcomes do you believe the Allies should achieve?

- Ukraine will certainly remain one of the key issues on the agenda, but I think the discussion will go much further than the war itself. NATO is entering a period where strategic resilience is becoming just as important as military capabilities. It is not only about military resilience, but also political, social and institutional resilience. These are the issues NATO needs to address if it wants to adapt to today's security environment. Türkiye is ready for this discussion because it has gained this experience through years of managing regional crises.

The Summit will focus on three major priorities. The first is burden-sharing - how Allies will distribute the financial responsibility for collective defence. The second is the future of the defence industry. NATO will need stronger industrial capacity, technological innovation and closer cooperation in defence production. The third priority is support for Ukraine and strategic resilience, because future security will depend not only on military strength but also on the ability of societies and institutions to withstand crises.

Another important issue is logistics and connectivity. Transport corridors, energy infrastructure and military mobility are becoming strategic assets. Türkiye's geographical position gives it a unique role in connecting Europe with the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Projects such as the Middle Corridor should therefore be viewed not only as economic initiatives but also as part of Europe's future security architecture.

Ukraine will remain central to all these discussions because the war has fundamentally changed the security environment in Europe and around the world. I believe the Summit will not only reaffirm support for Ukraine but will also focus on how NATO should adapt to a much more challenging strategic environment while continuing to support Ukraine.

- How do you assess Türkiye's role within NATO at a time of growing security challenges?

- Türkiye occupies a unique position within NATO because of its geography and security environment. Unlike many other Allies, it is located at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus. This means Ankara faces multiple security challenges simultaneously and has accumulated extensive experience in managing regional crises.

While NATO remains the cornerstone of Türkiye's security architecture, it is not Ankara's only strategic option. Over the years, Türkiye has sought to diversify its security partnerships while remaining a committed member of the Alliance. For more than seventy years, it has served as a bridge between Europe and Asia and has played an important role in safeguarding NATO's southern and southeastern flanks.

Another important aspect is Türkiye's military capacity. It possesses one of NATO's largest armed forces, but in recent years its focus has shifted toward strengthening its domestic defence industry. Developing strategic autonomy in defence production has become a national priority, supported by both state institutions and private companies. The experience gained from conflicts in Syria, Libya, the Black Sea region and the war in Ukraine has accelerated the development of Türkiye's defence sector and expanded its capabilities.

TÜRKIYE FOLLOWS THREE PRINCIPLES: STRATEGIC AUTONOMY, MEDIATION AND DIALOGUE

- How does Türkiye balance its NATO commitments with its policy of strategic autonomy?

 - Türkiye believes NATO membership and strategic autonomy are not mutually exclusive. Maintaining dialogue with countries such as Russia and China does not weaken Ankara's commitment to the Alliance; rather, it allows Türkiye to act as a channel of communication at times when direct contacts become difficult.

Türkiye follows three principles: strategic autonomy, mediation and dialogue. This approach also explains Türkiye's active diplomacy beyond NATO. Whether engaging in discussions with Russia, mediating regional disputes in the Middle East or supporting diplomatic initiatives elsewhere, Ankara seeks to preserve channels of communication while remaining an active member of the Alliance. From the Turkish perspective, maintaining dialogue with different actors enhances regional stability and ultimately serves the interests of both Türkiye and its NATO partners.

- What role can Türkiye play in strengthening NATO's logistics and transport corridors?

- Logistics is becoming one of the defining elements of international security. Modern competition is increasingly centred not only on military power but also on transport routes, energy infrastructure and supply chains.

Türkiye occupies a strategic position connecting Europe with the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Projects such as the Middle Corridor, new transport routes linking Iraq and Türkiye, and future railway connections could become important strategic assets for both NATO and European partners.

The Black Sea and the Turkish Straits also give Türkiye a significant logistical advantage. In the future, transport corridors will not only facilitate trade but also strengthen energy security and military mobility. The COVID-19 pandemic and growing geopolitical competition have demonstrated how vulnerable global supply chains can become, making the protection of these corridors increasingly important.

THERE IS STILL ROOM FOR DIPLOMACY TO END THE RUSSIA–UKRAINE WAR

- You have pointed out that Türkiye's policy of strategic autonomy enables it to maintain dialogue with Russia. Ahead of the NATO Summit, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Moscow and reaffirmed Türkiye's readiness to facilitate peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. Do you believe these efforts could create new opportunities for peace in Ukraine?

- I believe there is still room for diplomacy. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's visit to Moscow was important not only because he met with Russian Foreign Ministry officials, but also because he held discussions with key representatives of Russia's security establishment. Coming just before the NATO Summit, the visit sent a clear message that Türkiye intends to keep channels of communication open while remaining a committed NATO Ally.

At the same time, it was also a message to Ukraine and Türkiye's Western partners. Ankara has repeatedly reaffirmed its readiness to facilitate negotiations whenever both sides are prepared to engage. Türkiye has already demonstrated this during the Istanbul talks and the Black Sea Grain Initiative, proving that it can provide a credible platform for dialogue.

Türkiye cannot solve the bilateral political disputes between Ukraine and Russia. Those belong to the two parties themselves. But it can facilitate dialogue on issues where common interests still exist. This is where mediation becomes meaningful. If the parties themselves are willing to seek solutions, Ankara can help bring them to the table.

- Türkiye maintains dialogue with Moscow not only on negotiations and mediation, but also through active cooperation with Russia in other areas. Is this part of Türkiye's strategy of strategic autonomy?

- Türkiye is trying to pursue a balanced policy, but that should not be interpreted as neutrality between the aggressor and the victim. I would say that Türkiye is closer to Ukraine than to Russia. Türkiye has consistently opposed the war, supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Crimea, and has steadily strengthened its defence cooperation with Kyiv.

We have expanded bilateral trade, deepened defence-industrial cooperation and supplied military equipment to Ukraine. At the same time, Türkiye also maintain relations with Russia based on geographical proximity through maritime borders. Relations between two countries are underpinned by cooperation across a range of sectors, most notably energy, as well as trade, investment, tourism and societal engagement. So, Türkiye has maintained dialogue with Russia because we believe communication is essential if there is to be any chance of diplomacy or mediation.

Maintaining channels of communication does not mean abandoning principles.

This is what I call compartmentalization. States should not discuss every issue in one negotiation. Türkiye may disagree with Russia over Ukraine while continuing dialogue on the Black Sea, Syria or other regional issues. That is a rational approach to diplomacy.

- What practical steps could help move the peace process forward?

-  First, both sides need to identify issues where common interests still exist. The Black Sea is one such area because stability there benefits every coastal state.

Second, negotiations should focus on practical cooperation rather than trying to resolve every political disagreement simultaneously. Türkiye believes confidence can be rebuilt step by step.

Another important point is connectivity. Projects such as the Middle Corridor, regional transport routes and economic cooperation should not be designed against any particular country. If these initiatives become instruments of geopolitical exclusion, they are likely to generate new tensions instead of reducing existing ones.

Türkiye's position remains consistent. It supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity while also arguing that a sustainable peace cannot be achieved without engaging Russia in negotiations. The objective is not to isolate one side but to create conditions in which diplomacy can eventually succeed.

NO COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES IS LIKELY; AT BEST, WE MAY SEE ANOTHER TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT

- The United States and Iran are currently engaged in a new round of negotiations. Do you see these talks leading to a lasting agreement?

- I think what we are witnessing is more of a temporary understanding than a lasting agreement. The current framework gives both sides additional time, but it does not resolve the core issues dividing Washington and Tehran.

There are also domestic political considerations. The United States, Israel and Iran all have their own internal dynamics, and none of them appears interested in a major escalation at this moment. That is why I believe both sides are trying to manage the crisis rather than solve it.

The nuclear programme, ballistic missiles, sanctions and regional security remain extremely difficult issues. I do not expect a comprehensive agreement in the near future. At best, we may see another temporary arrangement.

- What are the biggest obstacles preventing Washington and Tehran from reaching a comprehensive agreement?

- The first obstacle is that the negotiations do not fully reflect the regional picture. Israel is one of the key actors in this crisis, yet it is not formally part of the process. Without addressing Israel's security concerns and its role in the region, it will be difficult to achieve a sustainable settlement.

The second issue is Iran's regional influence. Its relations with armed groups and non-state actors across the Middle East remain a major concern for many countries, including Türkiye and the Gulf states.

Even if progress is achieved on the nuclear issue, these broader geopolitical questions will remain unresolved. That is why I think any agreement reached now will most likely remain temporary.

EXTERNAL PRESSURE CONSOLIDATES IRANIAN SOCIETY

- Despite military pressure and domestic discontent, the Iranian regime has demonstrated remarkable resilience. How do you explain this?

- One reason is that external pressure often strengthens national solidarity instead of weakening it.

Many Iranians may disagree with the government, but during a military confrontation they do not necessarily support foreign intervention. There is a significant difference between opposing your own government and supporting another country attacking your homeland.

Another important factor is the strength of Iranian state institutions. Even if individual political leaders disappear, the institutions remain. The bureaucracy, the security apparatus and the political system continue functioning.

This is why I often speak about resilience. Military power alone does not determine whether a country can survive a crisis. Political resilience, institutional resilience and social resilience are equally important. Iran has demonstrated this quite clearly.

- Do you think the United States miscalculated how Iranian society would respond to military pressure?

- I think there was an expectation that military pressure could trigger an internal uprising against the regime. That expectation proved unrealistic.

Many people who oppose the government still see themselves as patriots. During an external conflict they tend to rally around the state rather than support outside pressure.

The opposition has not disappeared. Rather, it has postponed its confrontation with the government until external threats diminish. Therefore, military pressure alone is unlikely to produce political change.

MANY WESTERN OBSERVERS UNDERESTIMATE THE IMPORTANCE OF SHIA IDENTITY OF IRANIANS

- How does it work?

- I think this is one of the most important aspects of understanding Iran. The Karbala narrative is one of the central historical and religious narratives of Shia Islam. When Iran comes under external pressure, the government does not rely solely on military power. It also mobilises historical memory. The narrative of Karbala, Imam Hussein and sacrifice has been part of Shia political identity for centuries. It is not simply a religious story; it is a political narrative that encourages resistance against what is perceived as injustice or oppression.

Many observers in the West underestimate the importance of identity. They often focus on sanctions, military capabilities or economic indicators, but identity also shapes political behaviour.

The revival of Shia identity during periods of conflict should not be underestimated. Rather than weakening the Islamic Republic, external pressure may strengthen the ideological foundations on which the state has been built.

WE ARE LIKELY TO WITNESS A GRAND BARGAIN BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND BEIJING OVER SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

- In your book "Chinese Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East," you argued that China would become one of the defining powers of the emerging international order. Looking at the war in Ukraine and the current geopolitical landscape, has your assessment changed?

- No, my assessment has not changed. I still believe the future international order will be based on a co-hegemonic model between the United States and China. If these two powers do not learn how to coexist, they risk destroying themselves. They are simply too large to ignore one another.

I believe we will eventually see a great bargain between Washington and Beijing over their respective spheres of influence. In my view, this process has already begun, although it is taking place quietly and gradually.

China will increasingly focus on the Asia-Pacific, while the United States will continue to concentrate on Europe and the Atlantic community. Unfortunately, regions such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and parts of Eurasia may remain the space where these major powers continue to compete. Africa is expected to become an increasingly important theater of great-power competition, representing a southward expansion of the strategic rivalries currently observed along the East-West axis.

RUSSIA HAS LOST ITS STATUS AS A GLOBAL POWER BECAUSE OF ITS WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

- Is Russia not included in this "formula"?

- Personally, I no longer see Russia as one of the defining global powers. Russia remains a large country with significant military capabilities and vast energy resources, but today's competition is increasingly driven by technology, artificial intelligence, connectivity and advanced industries.

The war has prevented Russia from keeping pace in these areas. While Russia is investing enormous resources in the war against Ukraine, it is falling behind in technological development. China, meanwhile, continues to expand its technological capacity while purchasing Russian energy at highly favourable prices.

In many respects, the current relationship benefits Beijing more than Moscow. Russia needs China far more than China needs Russia.

- China maintains close ties with Russia while avoiding support for Ukraine, yet it continues to present itself as a neutral mediator. How do you assess Beijing's position, and how credible is its claim of neutrality?

- China is acting very carefully. It has avoided direct military involvement because its priority is not the war itself but its long-term strategic competition with the United States.

Beijing is negotiating with Washington on a wide range of issues—from trade and technology to artificial intelligence and strategic competition. These discussions are far more important for China's long-term interests than becoming directly involved in the war in Ukraine.

From China's perspective, as long as the broader relationship with the United States remains stable, there is little incentive to become militarily engaged elsewhere.

China is also selective in its international engagement. Despite conflicts in the Middle East, Syria, Gaza and elsewhere, Beijing has largely avoided direct political or military involvement. Its primary concern remains its own strategic environment, especially Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.

- You mentioned that technology and connectivity will become the foundation of future geopolitical competition. Why are these two factors so important?

- In the future, two things will matter above all: energy and connectivity. Technology cannot function without reliable energy supplies, and digital economies cannot function without secure infrastructure. Artificial intelligence, data centres and advanced industries all depend on electricity and global connectivity.

That is why transport corridors, fibre-optic networks and energy infrastructure are becoming strategic assets. If those connections are disrupted, even the most advanced technologies become ineffective.

This is also why China invests so heavily in connectivity projects. They are not simply economic initiatives; they are strategic investments in the future international order.

Olga Budnyk, Ankara

Photos provided by Anadolu Ajansı, Son Dakika and ORSAM