Japan has remained largely immune to what is now the infamous wrath of U.S. President Donald Trump. To be sure, it did not receive special treatment when “Liberation Day” arrived on April 2, 2025 – when Trump imposed a worldwide tariff regime that was later struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in February. Japan also continues to be, like many other allies, criticized by the president for not paying its fair share of the security burden.

However, on trade, Japan turned a potential crisis into an opportunity by holding its line – particularly on automobiles and agricultural products. It has become the only nation to formulate and advance an investment strategy in the United States that appears to offer reciprocal value to Japanese businesses while strengthening Japan’s overall supply chain resilience for critical materials. Japan under Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae is also strengthening its resolve to bear a greater defense burden by increasing defense spending, revising its national security strategy, and demonstrating a willingness to take part in a potential conflict.

While nations perceived as not sufficiently “appreciating” the United States’ continued commitment to international security and to the defense of its allies – expressed in controversial ways, such as demanding to acquire Greenland and pressuring Ukraine into a ceasefire – have become targets of Trump’s volatility, Japan has thus far succeeded in maintaining a positive working relationship through two prime ministers. In fact it appears that through their exchanges, Japan’s leaders under the second Trump administration have acquired a certain amount of respect from the president.

In describing Ishiba Shigeru, Trump referred to him as “a very strong man” – a high compliment in his vocabulary – and even called him on one occasion without any pressing matter, reportedly startling the Japanese government. Regarding Takaichi, her election victory has reinforced Trump’s view of her as a “very popular, powerful woman.” Notable courtesy was extended to Takaichi during the most recent Oval Office meeting, though that may have been blurred by the president’s awkward remarks on the Pearl Harbor attack.

Observing Trump’s apparent keenness toward Japan casts his past criticisms in a different light. During the 1980s, Japan was a prime target of Trump’s public attacks. He believed that Japan was reaping the security benefits provided by the United States while flooding the U.S. market with its own products and enjoying its postwar economic miracle. He seemed to believe that Japan was taking advantage of the U.S. economically, despite the fact that the United States had helped enable its rise. 

However, drawing on interviews Trump gave over the years, Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman have argued that his real grievance lay less with Japan itself than with the U.S. elite, whom he believed had been outmaneuvered by U.S. allies. More recently, one of Trump’s remarks about Japan’s restrictions on certain imports on “Liberation Day” encapsulated his view of Japan as both a rival and a respectable competitor:

Japan – very, very tough, great people. And again, I don’t blame the people for doing it. I think they’re very smart in doing it. I blame the people that sat right in that Oval Office right over there, right behind the Resolute Desk or whichever desk they chose.

Although Japan does not publicly press its case against the United States – a point some outlets noted in light of the recent Takaichi-Trump summit – it has, in recent decades, proven itself to be a reliable ally, ready to assist when needed without being overly obtrusive. It was one of the countries willing to provide the United States with moral support when the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq, and Japan even passed a law allowing the Self-Defense Forces to be deployed to potential active war zones. This move caused controversy in the Diet at the time and represented a significant effort to support an isolated ally, especially given the rigid restrictions that Japan’s interpretation of its constitution had imposed on sending troops abroad.

The reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution in 2014, which provided the basis for the security legislation passed in 2015, was also part of Japan’s effort to be a trusted ally in times of crisis. Those laws enabled Japan to offer expanded logistical and military support to the United States and opened the path to strengthening military cooperation with other partners in contingencies affecting Japan’s security. This, too, was an effort undertaken by the Japanese government in part to increase its trustworthiness as an ally in the eyes of the United States.

In April 2024, then-Prime Minister Kishida Fumio delivered a speech at a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress, where he argued for the continued U.S. commitment to upholding the international order and explained how Japan could help support that effort. He thanked the United States for the “noble sacrifices” it had made for the betterment of the world, and expressed sympathy for the growing “self-doubt,” as well as the “loneliness and exhaustion” that many Americans had been feeling under the overwhelming burden of serving as a benevolent superpower. “You are not alone” was Kishida’s central message, as he also pledged that Japan would stand in lockstep with the United States.

The late Mike Mansfield, a former American ambassador to Japan, said that “the U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.” He later explained that his judgment of Japan’s importance was based on his view of Japan’s role as a “barrier against communism in Asia.” Although the specter of communism has become a relic of the past, Japan-U.S. relations continue to retain their strategic utility.

Having redefined its role from a Cold War security arrangement to an “Alliance for the 21st Century” in 1996, the partnership remains a cornerstone of security in East Asia. Economic ties between Japan and the United States are also likely to deepen as concerns over economic security and friend-shoring become more prominent. Any new Japanese investment in the U.S. would come on top of Japan already being the United States’ largest source of foreign direct investment.

Japan rarely takes a moralistic stance on international problems and even more rarely criticizes the United States openly, although an increasing number of U.S. allies have become inclined to do precisely that. As the United States grows more isolated, as war in the Middle East depletes its resources, and as the security environment in the Indo-Pacific – which the Trump administration has described as a “key economic and geopolitical battleground” worthy of sustained American competition – continues to tilt against the U.S. position, Japan’s geopolitical significance and value as a partner will continue to grow.

The United States should recognize that Japan has stood by its side within the limits of its capacity, even when doing so may have seemed unpopular to other countries and even to its own citizens. Such a friend is difficult to find, and such a friendship is worth nurturing.