Twenty-five years ago, the September 11 attacks transformed Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. Almost overnight, Pakistan went from facing American sanctions and limited diplomatic attention to becoming a frontline partner in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.

In its counterterrorism cooperation, Pakistan offered vital ground-and air-based logistical transit to Afghanistan as well as intelligence and military action. In return, the United States provided financial reimbursement and military assistance in the form of subsidized sale of military hardware and technology. 

The relationship became increasingly strained as the two sides accused each other of failing to deliver what had been promised. Yet the two sides remained close as long as Washington needed Pakistan for the war in Afghanistan.

When the U.S. military withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, much of the urgency behind the relationship disappeared. Washington’s political attention declined, although counterterrorism, trade, health, and other forms of engagement continued at the institutional level.

Twenty-five years after 9/11, Pakistan and the United States appear to have entered another period of warm relations. Pakistan has again presented itself as a useful partner through mediation between Washington and Tehran, alongside cryptocurrency deals, critical mineral investments, and counterterrorism cooperation.

As Pakistan mediates in the Iran-U.S. war, given the difficulties of reaching a truce, there’s a constant fear of Pakistani leaders becoming the eventual fall guys. To avert that outcome, Islamabad has been investing significant time and resources to the success of the mediation efforts. The outcome has been far from assured.

Some see this as another example of Pakistan over-promising and falling short of delivering. But there’s a bigger question behind recent events: Why does every revival of Pakistan-U.S. relations require another geopolitical crisis?

The problem is that Pakistan-U.S. relations lack enough independent commercial, institutional, academic, and professional connections to maintain political engagement when the immediate geopolitical transaction ends. 

The contrast with India-U.S. relations helps explain this problem.

During the early 2000s, India-U.S. ties were largely driven from the top. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pushed through the civil nuclear agreement despite serious opposition within both countries. Over the following two decades, the relationship created its own institutional and economic constituencies. Technology companies, universities, defense manufacturers, investors, and the Indian diaspora now have their own reasons for sustaining it. Daniel Markey described this as “a reversal of the motive forces behind U.S.-India ties: from top-down to bottom-up.”

This explains why India-U.S. relations have survived serious political headwinds during current U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term. The two countries disagreed over trade, immigration, Russia, Pakistan, and the war with Iran. Yet their military, economic, and technological engagement has continued. 

The clearest evidence is the new ten-year Framework for the U.S.-India Major Defense Partnership signed in October 2025 and the expansion of the Biden-era iCET (initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies) mechanism into TRUST (Transforming Relations into Utilizing Strategic Technologies) in February 2025, covering artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum computing, biotechnology, energy, space, critical minerals, and pharmaceutical supply chains. 

When it comes to China, the Trump administration’s narrower focus on denying Beijing control of the First Island Chain arguably reduces India’s direct operational relevance compared with Japan and the Philippines. India’s relevance in the U.S. strategic competition with China will therefore depend on whether Washington continues to see the Indian and Pacific oceans as disjointed theaters and whether India remains restricted to its immediate neighborhood.

Pakistan faces different conditions. For one, it is a close strategic and defense partner of China. Although democratic credentials are not attracting as much U.S. attention under the Trump administration, there are other constraints on the relationship. Pakistan’s security problems discourage tourism, investment, and academic exchange. Its universities and think tanks have fewer sustained partnerships with American institutions. Pakistan also lacks India’s economic scale, technological capacity, and purchasing power.

This does not mean that Pakistan lacks bottom-up ties with the United States. The United States is Pakistan’s largest single export market and one of the largest FDI sources. American companies operate profitably in sectors of Pakistan’s economy – franchising, fast-moving consumer goods, agribusiness and financial services – with growing interest in information technology, renewable energy, and healthcare. 

The Karachi-based American Business Council has more than 55 member companies, most of them Fortune 500 firms. The Lahore-based American Business Forum has 23 founding members and 22 associate members. Moreover, thousands of Pakistani healthcare professionals, STEM professionals, and academics actively bridge the economic and educational landscapes of both societies. 

Yet these connections remain demonstrably insufficient to determine the overall direction of the relationship. Political leaders, military officials, and regional events continue to provide the ballast for Pakistan-U.S..

Pakistan has apparently sought new ways to demonstrate its utility to Washington. Critical minerals, cryptocurrency, counterterrorism, and mediation with Iran all form part of this effort. While these initiatives can produce real economic and diplomatic gains, they could also reproduce the old transactional cycle if they remain agreements among senior officials or a small number of political- and military-linked businesses.

It is difficult for Pakistan to reproduce India’s bottom-up relationship with the United States, given India’s relative economic scale and its geopolitical position vis-à-vis China. 

Still, Islamabad can become less dependent on its temporary geopolitical utility. This would require producing high value-added textile exports and diversifying the overall export supplies. Pakistan can also do more to attract U.S. grassroots engagement by improving domestic security, ensuring constant energy supply, sustaining the current simplified tariff and tax regime to attract investment, protecting contracts and intellectual property, and building stronger links among universities, think tanks, and businesses. 

Pakistan should also use its diaspora for professional, technological, and commercial cooperation instead of viewing it mainly as a source of remittances and political support.

Pursuing these policies will ensure Pakistan-U.S. integration beyond just economic diplomacy. Instead of announcing deals and foreign visits to catch ephemeral attention, Islamabad must commit toward building industries and relationships with the U.S. that continue after the leaders leave office or the geopolitical focus shifts. Doing so will give the partnership a stronger foundation.