A nice new paper called Price of Censorship: Censorship Resistance and Throughput under Rational Concurrent Proposers caught my attention a couple of weeks ago and I have been thinking about it ever since. Saraf et al. derived the cost to effectively censor transactions in Multiple Proposer Protocols and bounds under different transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs). Given my current interest in Sybils, I thought that it would be a good idea to look into how the bounds change in the existence of Sybil nodes and how it changes the conclusion of the paper with implications for MCP protocols.
Check it out: Price of Censorship in Multiple Concurrent Proposers under Sybils
| # | Наименование новости | Тональность | Информативность | Дата публикации |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Rapidblocks, take two: a pipelined consensus for independent blocks | 0 | 5.78 | 13-10-2026 |
| 2 | PQ anonymity for Stealth Address Protocol | 0 | 10.76 | 10-10-2026 |
| 3 | Proposal for a minimal compute-anchored purchasing power signal | 0 | 7.88 | 11-10-2026 |
| 4 | Measuring priority fees, positions and transaction classification of Ethereum blocks, July 2025 to October 2026 | 0 | 10.83 | 16-10-2026 |
| 5 | Strict role alternation: reciprocal broadcast without relayers for EVM shielded pools (spec + population simulation, no code yet) | 0 | 12.48 | 19-09-2026 |
| 6 | Informed Diffusion: making home builders publish fast | 0 | 9.3 | 13-10-2026 |
| 7 | Rapidblocks with split proofs: execution proofs that outlive their state | 0 | 5.9 | 14-10-2026 |
| 8 | Public-mempool gas sponsorship needs escrow, a bond, or trust | 0 | 6.46 | 14-09-2026 |
| 9 | Post-Glamsterdam One-dimensional Fee Market and Comparison with EIP-7999 | 0 | 13.47 | 22-09-2026 |