Summary and Key Points: Brent M. Eastwood asks whether the Trump-class battleship BBG(X), the planned USS Defiant with as many as 200 vertical launch cells for Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, can escape the Navy’s shipbuilding record: the $22 billion Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt destroyers cut from 32 to 3, the Constellation frigate canceled in November 2025 at 2 of 20, and the Ford’s 20-plus new systems, with GAO and CSIS’s Cynthia Cook blaming unstable designs.

While the new Trump-class battleship has enjoyed much fanfare from the White House, the planned effort, called the USS Defiant, could have an uncertain fate.

The new BBG(X) is the president’s favorite.

The Trump-class will have perhaps as many as 200 Vertical Launch cells that can fire Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic weapons and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. If built, this will be one heavy-duty missile barge. But, along with many other US Navy warships in recent years, it might never hit the water. 

However, the U.S. Navy has not enjoyed a good track record with new ships.

The Littoral Combat Ship, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and the Constellation-class frigate are troubled programs. These shipbuilding projects have either been canceled or seen the number of ships reduced from earlier goals. The Navy struggled to build them on time and under budget. 

They did not deliver on promises made before serial production, and sometimes they could not meet naval strategic needs.

The designs became concrete only when engineers and shipyard workers had them in hand. New requirements as time elapsed made the ships more expensive and their production uncertain. 

Too many technologies were being introduced at once.

Look no further than the USS Gerald R. Ford supercarrier, which was designed to feature new launch systems and arresting gear, plus over 20 new systems.

These plunged the program into delay mode, and the money invested in the flat-top evaporated. 

Other programs have been costly.

The Littoral Combat Ship program burned through $22 billion.

The small, lightly armored vessels were not suitable for ship-on-ship warfare against great powers and would be sitting ducks in what I call the Kinetic Missile Fight. 

The Navy originally wanted 32 Zumwalt-class destroyers.

That heady goal was nowhere near accomplished.

They built only three.

Its main gun had major problems: the rounds it was designed to fire cost nearly a million dollars each.

One could argue the Zumwalt-class could still be a hit once it is outfitted with hypersonic missiles, but the entire class should still be considered a failure. 

The Constellation-class may be the most disappointing case study in how not to build a ship.

The program was canceled in November 2025. Only two are being built, compared with an original goal of 20. 

One major problem a government auditor found was that the Navy began building the ships without considering how difficult it would be to incorporate new technology.

The lead vessels were built without a stable design.

The Government Accountability Office conducted a post-mortem review of all three failed programs, and the watchdogs were not pleased with what they found. Industry experts agree. 

PBS interviewed Cynthia Cook from the Center for International and Strategic Studies about why naval shipbuilding in the U.S. has become so hard in recent years.

Cook believes naval contractors face workforce shortages that create schedule slips.

“Ships are being constructed slower than we’d like them to be for a number of reasons. And, really, one of the biggest reasons is labor-force challenges.

I had one shipyard executive tell me that he would love to have a second shift, but he just can’t find the labor. During the pandemic, a number of workers retired, and so the labor force is relatively new, or, as they’re called, green labor,” Cook said.

Tyler Koteskey at Georgetown University also pointed to problems with personnel and human capital.

The Navy “so frequently changes its force size goals in response to political and budgetary pressure that these precise targets lead to significantly varying procurements each year.

These fluctuating demand signals create uncertainty for the maritime industry, discouraging investment in workforce development and infrastructure initiatives necessary to increase production capacity,” he wrote.

Mackenzie Eaglen and Representative Filemón Vela, writing for the National Commission on the Future of the U.S. Navy, are afraid that this and other “cycles of death” will be repeated in new shipbuilding programs.

They declared the main problem is insufficient planning. “The Navy routinely begins construction before it knows what it is building,” the authors explained, as noted by Real Clear Defense.

These problems snowball, creating broader project difficulties. “This pattern reflects a broader acquisition dynamic: an institutional tendency to pursue incremental capability enhancements even when doing so destabilizes production timelines.

Requirements creep in, personnel rotate through program offices, and each new stakeholder arrives with improvements to propose,” according to Christopher Carroll of Pepperdine University.

Many other issues have cropped up in U.S. warship production efforts. “Several factors contribute to the Navy’s procurement woes: fixed ever-changing force-level goals, faulty design and construction methods, and misplaced fleet design priorities,” according to Koteskey.

The new Trump-class battleship will put the Navy and its contractors to the test.

But do institutional problems in shipbuilding prevent even one new vessel?

The biggest problem is human capital. Everyone involved in ship development and construction needs to do better. 

Efficiency and economies of scale must be improved. Shipyards should hire new experts and retain existing workers before they leave for new jobs.

Design efforts need a rethink, and new technologies that sometimes fail to integrate need better oversight. 

The stakes are high to keep up with China. The Americans cannot afford to fail in future shipbuilding programs.

The Pentagon and Congress must change their ways, focus on new remedies that move the needle, and avoid falling back on old processes.

More ships are desperately needed, and the strategic outcome should favor a second-to-none shipbuilding industry.

The Navy must take a long look at watchdog reports and industry experts’ efforts to drive improvements that keep failures in check.

Author of now over 3,500 articles on defense issues, Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: A Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare, plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for US Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former US Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.